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ABSTRACT
The fourth industrial revolution leads to an increased use of em-
bedded computation and intercommunication in an industrial en-
vironment. While reducing cost and effort for set up, operation
and maintenance, and increasing the time to operation or market
respectively as well as the efficiency, this also increases the attack
surface of enterprises. Industrial enterprises have become targets
of cyber criminals in the last decade, reasons being espionage but
also politically motivated. Infamous attack campaigns as well as
easily available malware that hits industry in an unprepared state
create a large threat landscape. As industrial systems often oper-
ate for many decades and are difficult or impossible to upgrade in
terms of security, legacy-compatible industrial security solutions
are necessary in order to create a security parameter. One plausi-
ble approach in industry is the implementation and employment
of side-channel sensors. Combining readily available sensor data
from different sources via different channels can provide an en-
hanced insight about the security state. In this work, a data set of
an experimental industrial set up containing side channel sensors
is discussed conceptually and insights are derived.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Intrusion detection systems; Net-
work security; • Theory of computation→ Design and analysis
of algorithms; • Applied computing→ Enterprise architectures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As attacks on industry have increased in effect and frequency over
the last decades [7], securing industrial networks an applications
becomes crucial for industrial enterprises. Since many field-bus
and industrial Ethernet protocols do not contain means to ensure
authentication and encryption, gaining access to a network is suffi-
cient for an attacker to read and participate on the communication.
Novel protocols such as Object Linking and Embedding for Process
Control Unified Architecture (OPC UA) [23] provide means for secu-
rity of communication, but older protocols such as Modbus [20, 21]
and PROFINET [25] are still common in industrial Operation Tech-
nology (OT) networks. Due to the fourth industrial revolution, com-
munication and embedded computation devices are increasingly
integrated into industrial environments. Aside from the benefits
in terms of reduced operation, set up and maintenance cost and
effort, these devices also increase the attack surface. Historically,
two general assumptions motivated the reluctance to employ secure
protocols [17]: Industrial networks being physically separated from
public networks and the unique and application specific nature
of industrial control networks that is infeasible for an attacker to
comprehend. The first assumption is broken by the fourth indus-
trial revolution that relies heavily on intercommunication through
network boundaries. Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hard- and
software that makes integration, extension and set up easier enables
attackers to gain intelligence about their targets as well, breaking
the second assumption. Several recent attacks on industrial enter-
prises show the effects a cyber attack can have on a production
environment once security measures are broken. A relevant factor
are the operation times of industrial production machines which
are several decades. Often, those machinery is not easily updated
so that insecure legacy systems are operated. In this work an indus-
trial data set with side-channel sensors is presented and analysed
with respect to detectability of attacks in a qualitative fashion. An
overview of the state of the art is discussed in Section 2. The data set
is presented in Section 3, the sensor data is evaluated in Section 4.
Possibilities for intrusion detection are discussed in Section 5. A
conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
There is considerable research about industrial cyber attacks. Sev-
eral white papers address the widely known successful attacks on
industrial environments. Stuxnet, being the most famous, has been
discussed extensively [5, 18, 19, 28]. However, there has been a
number of different attacks with similar goals and impacts, such
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as Duqu [28], Industroyer/Crashoverride [3, 5], Flame [28], BlackEn-
ergy [3, 5], Havex [5] and Red October [28]. A review of Information
Technology (IT) and OT security of industrial enterprises by Posi-
tive Technologies revealed many exploitable flaws [24].
In addition to work analysing the specific attacks, research has
been done to address the lack of security in industrial applications
and protocols. They provide scientific analyses of individual aspects
of protocols commonly found in industrial environments. Giehl et
al. provide a framework to assess security controls in manufac-
turing environments [16]. Cherdantseva et al. provide a survey of
existing risk assessment methods and evaluate their usefulness with
respect to Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) sce-
narios [2]. The detection of cyber attacks is discussed by Gao and
Morris [15]. Their main focus is Modbus. Attacks based on Modbus
environments are grouped into different classes. Additionally, they
survey attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) [22]. Zhu et al.
take a similar approach and evaluate an abundance of different di-
mensions of consideration in industrial attacks [31]. IT systems are
systematically compared to OT system, among others with respect
to the security objectives that are most important in the respective
environment. A taxonomy for SCADA-specific attacks is presented
by Zhu and Sastry [32]. Concepts for secure SCADA systems are
designed by Fernandez et al. while presenting capabilities to evalu-
ate said systems in terms of security [13].
In addition to the industrial intrusion detection based on proto-
cols and models, there is a selection of works addressing side chan-
nels. Commonly, side channels are an attack vector found in various
application areas, such as acoustic side channel attacks on indus-
trial manufacturing [1], attacks on cryptographic hardware [30] and
quantum key distribution [29]. However, Van Aubel et al. present a
method to employ side channels for intrusion detection in ICSs [27].
They use the electro-magnetic field of a Programmable Logic Con-
troller (PLC) during operation, create motifs and compare those
motifs to the motifs of a PLC under attack. The electro-magnetic
field is used by Strobel et al. as well in order to disassemble firmware
and detect attacks on the hardware level [26].
3 DATA SET
The data set is presented by Duque Anton et al. [8]. It is derived from
a batch processing environment, set up with a Festo Didactic MPS
PA Compact Workstation, a workstation for training and education
purposes. The process environment is pictured in Figure 1. The data
set is introduced by Duque Anton et al. [8] and has been partially
analysed by them as well [9]. During normal operation, the pump
P101 transports water from Container 1 to Container 2 until an ad-
justable threshold value of the water level is reached. Due to natural
reflow, the water starts to leak from Container 2 into Container 1.
After the water level in Container 2 falls below the threshold value
adjusted by a hysteresis value that is adjustable as well, the pump
starts up again and fills Container 2 again. Normal behaviour is
shown in Figure 2. In this work, a look is taken at the third attack
scenario as described by the authors. This scenario is derived from
a process that was interrupted in two ways: first, the pump was not
turned off after the threshold was reached, leading to it running
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Figure 1: Structure of the Process Used to Create the Data Set
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Figure 2: Normal Behaviour of Process Used to Create the
Data Set
dry. Second, the release valve of Container 2 was opened, leading to
a constant and increased re-flow of water and more pump activity.
However, the PLC was configured in a way that all sensors and
actuator indicated normal operation. Side-channel sensors, such
as an acoustic sensor, were employed to still be able to detect the
deviation. The authors provided several side-channel sensor data,
of which the acoustic and flow sensor presented the most promising
insights.
4 SIDE-CHANNEL SENSORS
The data set presented in Section 3 covers the duration of about
20 minutes. Thus, the data is not sufficient for full scale machine
learning-based analysis. Instead, a qualitative analysis is performed
by hand. Into this scenario, two attacks are introduced: The pump
staying active even though the threshold in Container 1 has been
reached and the re-flow valve being open even though the water
level is below threshold. Since this attack provides sensor and ac-
tuator values that are not distinguishable from normal operation,
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side-channel sensors are employed in order to detect attacks. In
this work, an acoustic sensor is analysed. In normal operation, two
different acoustic profiles can be distinguished: operation and in-
activity of the pump. The first attack changes the acoustic profile
of the pump operation as shown in Figure 3. In this figure, the
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Figure 3: Attack 1 in Comparison to Normal Pump Activity
in the Data Set
dotted lines represent the attack behaviour, while the solid lines
were recorded during normal operation of the pump during activity.
Five events in the data set were taken for the normal data, while
there was one malicious event. It is shown that frequencies above
about 4 000 contain a higher amplitude during the attack, indicated
by the dashed line. This characteristic can be used to create an
automated detection mechanism for this kind of attack based on
the acoustic profile. The second attack changes the acoustic pro-
file while the pump is inactive, as shown in Figure 4. Similar to
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Figure 4: Attack 2 inComparison toNormal Pump Inactivity
in the Data Set
the figure above, the dotted lines represent the attack behaviour,
while the solid lines were recorded during normal operation of
the pump during inactivity, i.e. the pump was turned of and only
re-flow of water occurred. Five events in the data set were taken
for the normal data, while there were three malicious event. In this
case, the amplitude of frequencies above about 5 000 is significantly
higher for an attack, indicated by the dashed lines, than during
normal operation. This feature can be used for detection as well. In
a productive environment, profiles of different parts of the process
could be created and trained. Automated signature detection can be
used to detect deviations from the normal profiles and thus detect
attacks that could not be detected with conventional means.
5 SIDE CHANNEL-BASED INTRUSION
DETECTION
As shown in the previous section, the acoustic data is capable of
distinguishing between normal and anomalous operation. One pos-
sible metric for the detection of attacks based on anomalies in
the acoustic data is extracting expressive frequencies and compar-
ing their energy. Promising candidates are 5, 10, and 19 kHz. A
more sophisticated approach is the creation of motifs based on
the respective spectral information, as for example done in speech
recognition, for example with autoencoders as presented by Deng
et al. [4]. As the amount of motifs is expected to be relatively small
due to the periodic behaviour of industrial environments, the mem-
ory requirements are feasible. One of the challenges, however, is
correctly identifying the length as well as beginning and end point
of the motifs, so that different steps of processing can be assigned
their corresponding motifs. In praxis, a microphone would monitor
the acoustic properties of the device under investigation, create a
representation of the acoustic profile and compare it to the data
base of known good profiles. If there is a deviation larger than a
justifiable threshold, a human operator is alerted. In addition to
attacks, malfunctions and the need for maintenance actions can be
detected with this approach.
6 CONCLUSION
Due to the increase in attacks on industrial process environments,
intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms need to be inte-
grated into OT networks. Since an abundance of infrastructure
is used for long operation times that is hard to update, industrial
security solutions need to be compatible to legacy systems. They
need to integrate into existing environments. Side channel sensors
provide such means as they are relatively independent of the actual
processes. The information gathered by side-channel sensors can
be used, e.g. by industrial Security Information and Event Manage-
ment (SIEM) systems, to provide for a more holistic picture of the
security stand [11, 12]. However, processing sensor data in a mean-
ingful fashion requires understanding of process and data, even
though automated motif extraction can aid the process of detecting
or creating patterns. In order to secure industrial environments,
new approaches need to be evaluated, side-channels as well as emu-
lation environments for industrial security concepts being crucial. If
such systems are combined with anomaly detection approaches, e.g.
in the timing behaviour [6] or on a packet basis [10], attacks can be
detected at several points in the industrial environment. Deception
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technologies, such as honeypots [14], create a defence-in-depth
approach of several layered security solutions. The future work
consists of combining and implementing the individual methods
into a framework for security evaluation and assessment.
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